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If a Rip van Winkle had gone to sleep at the end of
about 1870 and woken up in the last few years, he would find that
little has changed in the world economy. He would note the various
technological advances in transportation and communications
(airlines, telephones and the computer) which have further reduced
the costs of international trade and commerce and led to the
progressive integration of the world economy which was well under
way after the first Great Age of Reform, when he went to sleep.
The terrible events of this century- two world wars, a
Great Depression and the battles against two illiberal  creeds-
Fascism and Communism- which led to the breakdown of the first
liberal international economic  order(LIE0)  - created under British
leadership after the Repeal of the Corn Laws- would form no part
of his memory. Nor would the various and varying fads in economic
policy-both national and international  - during this century make
any sense, eg. exchange controls, the use of quotas rather than
tariffs as instruments of protection, centralized planning and
associated controls on production and distribution, and
restrictions on the free flow of capital.
Having read his De Tocqueville he would also not be
surprised that the US and Russia had become Great Powers in the
latter part of this century. Nor, that it took the US nearly a
century to become the predominant power, just as it took Britain4
nearly a century from the mid 18th century conflict with France
till the end of the Napoleonic Wars to achieve its predominance.
His reading of De Tocqueville would also allow him to see a
natural progression from the rise of Great Britain -which was in a
sense the victory of an aristocratic oligarchy over the divine
right of kings- to that of the US, which is a victory of Demos
over aristocracy. Whether this is an unmixed blessing is open to
questi0n.l
He2 would be surprised by two features of the current
world economy. For unlike the 19th century when there was free
movement of goods, money and people, today there are relatively
free flows of goods and money but no free movement of labor. This
is related to the second surprising feature he would observe: the
welfare states to be found in most advanced countries, which as he
would soon recognize, have created property rights in citizenship.
This, necessarily leads to restrictions on immigration. For
immigration creates new citizens with an automatic right of access
to the purses of existing citizens through the transfer state.
Having gone to sleep in 1870 before the great
scramble for Empire by the nations of Europe, and the universal
spread of the Romantic movement's ideal of nationalism, he would
also not be surprised by the twin theses of Dick Rosecrance who we
are honoring at this  conference.3  First, that the territorial
imperative which had motivated competition between nation states
since the end of the wars of religion was replaced by the
commercial competition of trading states following the example of
Great Britain in the first great Age of Reform. Second, that as
more and more developing countries, particularly India and China
with their vast pools of relatively cheap labor, are brought into
an integrated world economy, a new international division of labor
is emerging, with developed countries mainly providing services
and developing ones manufactures. With this spatial division
between 'the head' and 'the body' of economic activity, trade is
becoming essential for the well-being of all countries, thus5
reducing the attractions of nationalism and war.
He would also not be surprised by the consensual
economic policies increasingly embraced around the world as they
echo those of the standard textbook of 19th century political
economy - Mill's  Principles.4 Though he would be surprised by the
technicalities in which the discussions were conducted-
particularly amongst the new breed of academic economists- he
would have no difficulty in understanding and endorsing their
prescriptions  : sound money, Gladstonian finance and a general
acceptance of the 19th century policy prescription of "laissez
faire". Having missed the heated discussions and theories
concerning planning, Keynesian macroeconomics, optimum taxation
and various other fads and fashions, he could happily neglect the
voluminous literature they spawned in the time he had been asleep.
But being of a curious bent he would probably have
decided to read some condensed account of what had happened to the
world while he was sleeping. He would have been astounded by the
events of this century- of a world gone mad. He would have tried
to find an explanation of what had gone wrong, and why and when
the tide turned to enable the world economy to resume the progress
which had stalled after he had gone to sleep. He would also wonder
if the coming century would repeat the mistakes of the last, or if
that age of universal worldwide peace and prosperity which seemed
imminent towards the end of the great 19th century Age of Reform
was now in prospect. These are the themes I will explore on Rip
van Winkle's behalf in the rest of this essay. But before that I
need to provide some harder evidence than Rip's casual empiricism
for his belief that the world economy has picked up where it left
off in the late 19th century.
I. REMEMBRANCE OF THINGS PAST
There are two pieces of statistical evidence which show
that the world economy is back to where it was in the late 19th
century. The first concerns the integration of global capital
markets. The second the integration of world commodity markets6
through trade and thus indirectly the world markets for labor.
Determining the extent of global capital market integration
has spawned a vast literature surveyed masterfully by Obstfield
(1995). For our comparative historical purpose what we need is a
statistical measure of this integration for which we can obtain
historical data to see the trends in capital market integration
over the last century. There are essentially two routes- a price
and a quantity route. On the price measure, if capital markets
were globally integrated, the price of an asset must be the same
wherever it is sold. In practice it is very difficult to test this
implication because there is insufficient data on identical assets
in different markets. One data set that Obstfeld (1995) has used
is the onshore-offshore price differential on a given asset. But
the Euro currency markets which allow these comparisons are a post
Second World War invention, and we cannot make similar historical
comparisons.
The second route (via quantity) is based on the argument
that in a completely integrated global capital market, as the
productivity of a country's investment is not necessarily linked
to the determinants of its savings rate, a rise in the latter
should lead to their most efficient deployment world wide, which
ceteris paribus should lead to a current  account surplus and a
capital outflow, and conversely if there is a rise in the
productivity of a country's investment, to a capital account
deficit and a capital inflow. This has been used by Feldstein and
Horioka (1980) to argue that, in such a world, the savings and
investment rates in a particular country should not be
systematically associated. They suggest a cross section
regression of the form  :
(  I/Y) j=a+b  (S/Y)j  +uj
where I/Y is the investment ratio; S/Y the savings ratio, and u
a random disturbance for each country j. If capital is completely
immobile  b=l, so that the lower the value of b from unity  the
greater the degree of capital mobility.7
There are various problems with the implementation and
interpretation of these type of  regressions5. But, despite this,
as the data on savings and investment rates is readily available,
faut mieux, at least an imperfect measure of capital market
integration can be derived. There are moreover, two sets of data
(with somewhat different countries covered) which allow us to
obtain estimates of b from the late 19th century to the present.
These are those compiled by Taylor (1996) and Maddison (1991,
1992). Taylor has estimated the b coefficients for his historical
data and we have done so for the Maddison data. The resulting
values are charted in Fig.1 whose notes list the countries and the
statistical significance of our estimates based on the Maddison
data is given in Table 1. It also incorporates the estimated
coefficients for a pooled sample of Taylor and Maddison countries.
A similar story emerges from all three trends in the b
estimates, which is in consonance with the qualitative historical
evidence we have on changing capital mobility over this long
period.6 What this shows is that till 1900 there was growing
capital market integration, which was partially reversed in the
early part of this century. There was a partial recovery in
integration in the  1920's, but with the Great Depression and the
Second World War there was further disintegration which continued
into the post war period till the 60's. This was followed by some
increased integration, but which did not become marked till the
1980's. So that now the index is roughly where it was in 1870 when
Rip went to sleep!
To determine the degree of globalization of commodity
markets, we will use the historical data on real wage trends for a
number of countries around the Atlantic basin which has been put
together by Jeffrey Williamson and his collaborators.7 The
Hecksher-Ohlin theory predicts that with growing integration of
commodity markets through international trade there should be
convergence in real wage rates as the low wages of the labor
abundant countries rise towards those of labor scarce countries.8
Fig 2, charts an index of the dispersion of real wage rates
(measured by the co-efficient of variation) for the time series
for the Atlantic economies derived
to 1986 for 15 countries (4 in the
There is first the period till
divergence of real wages because
high transport costs, and modest
by Williamson (1995) from 1830
New World, and 11 in the Old).
1845 when there was a sharp
of continuing trade barriers,
international labor migration.
Then, second, after the Repeal of Corn Laws in Britain in 1846 and
the subsequent creation of the first LIE0 under British leadership
there is a marked and continuing convergence in real wage rates
that continues till 1900. This was the period during which Rip
went to sleep, when there were sharp falls in transport costs' and
trade barriers, and free international migration of labor and
capital. With the creeping protectionism at the end of the century
this trend comes to an end. There follows the third period from
1900 and the Two World Wars, till about 1950, when there is a
growing dispersion of real wages. This is the period in which the
LIE0 breaks down with the disintegration of world commodity and
factor markets. The fourth period is the gradual reconstruction of
a new LIE0 under US aegis from about 1960 to the present, when
convergence in real wages begins and continues till the early
1970's, when there is a brief reversal (associated with the
travails induced by the OPEC oil
continued convergence in the  198Os,
back to where it was in 1900.
As much of the convergence
price shock) followed by
so that the index is nearly
in the 19th century LIE0 was
fuelled as much by international labor migration as the
integration of trade (see Williamson et al (1996)), the more
recent convergence in real wages is more likely to have been due
to trade integration, given the ubiquitousness of immigration
controls limiting the international migration of labor.
It would seem therefore that Rip's casual empiricism is
sound, and we can examine the three questions this rise, fall and
rise of the LIE0 over the last 150 years raises.II. WHY?
Broadly speaking the ghastly events of this century
and the breakdown of the 19th century LIE0 were due to the rise of
various ideas which questioned the economic and political
liberalism' that underlay the 19th century Age of Reform. In
delineating them and to put them into historical and intellectual
perspective some distinctions due to the English political
philosopher Michael Oakeshott are useful.
Oakeshott makes a crucial distinction between two
major strands of Western thought on the State: the State viewed
as a civil association, or alternatively as an enterprise
association. Oakeshott notes that the view of the State as a
civil association goes back to ancient Greece. The State is seen
as the custodian of laws which do not seek to impose any preferred
pattern of ends (including abstractions such as the general
(social) welfare, or fundamental rights), but which merely
facilitates individuals to pursue their own ends. This view has
been challenged by the rival conception of the State as an
enterprise association -- a view which has its roots in the
Judaeo-Christian tradition. The State is now seen as the manager
of an enterprise seeking to use the law for its own substantive
purposes, and in particular for the legislation of morality. The
classical liberalism of Smith and Hume entails the former, whilst
the major secular embodiment of society viewed as an enterprise
association is socialism, with its moral aim of using the State to
equalize people. Equally, the other major ideological challenge to
classical liberalism in this century, Fascism (national
socialism), also viewed the State as an enterprise association.
Both bred collectivist  moralities as a reaction to the morality of
individualism.
Oakeshott (1993) notes that as in many other
pre-industrial societies, modern Europe inherited a "morality of
communal ties" from the Middle Ages. This was gradually10
superseded from the 16th century by a morality of individuality,
whereby individuals came to value making their own choices
"concerning activities, occupations, beliefs, opinions, duties and
responsibilities" and also came to approve of this
"self-determined conduct" in others. This individualist morality
was fostered by the gradual breakdown of the medieval order which
allowed a growing number of people to escape from the "corporate
and communal organization" of medieval life.
But this dissolution of communal ties also bred what
Oakeshott terms the "anti-individual", who was unwilling or unable
to make his own choices. Some were resigned to their fate, but in
others it provoked "envy,jealousy  and resentment. And in these
emotions a new disposition was generated: the impulse to escape
from the predicament by imposing it upon all mankind" (p. 24)
This, the anti-individual sought to do through two means. The
first was to look to the government to "protect him from the
necessity of being an individual" (p. 25) A large number of
government activities epitomized by the Elizabethan Poor Law were
devoted from the 16th century onwards "to the protection of those
who, by circumstance or temperament, were unable to look after
themselves in this world of crumbling communal ties" (p. 25)
The anti-individual, secondly, sought to escape his "feeling
of guilt and inadequacy which his inability to embrace the
morality of individuality provoked" (p. 25) by calling forth a
"morality of collectivism", where "'security' is preferred to
'liberty', 'solidarity' to 'enterprise' and 'equality' to
'self-determination"' (p. 27) Both the individualist and
collectivist moralities were different modifications of the
earlier communal morality, but with the collectivist morality in
addition being a reaction against the morality of individualism.
This collectivist morality inevitably supported the view of
the State as an enterprise association. Whilst this view dates
back to antiquity, few if any pre-modern states were able to be
"enterprising", as their resources were barely sufficient to11
undertake the basic tasks of government-law and order and external
defense. This changed with the creation of centralized
"nation-states" by the Renaissance princes and the subsequent
Administrative Revolution, as Hicks (1969, p. 99) has labelled the
gradual expansion of the tax base and thus the span of control of
the government over its subjects lives. Governments now had the
power to look upon their activities as an enterprise.
There have been three versions of collectivist
moralities 0akeshot.t identifies with the State viewed as an
enterprise association. Since the truce declared in the 18th
century in the European wars of religion, the major substantive
purposes sought by States seen as enterprise associations are
"nation-building" and "the promotion of some form of
egalitarianism". These correspond to what Oakeshott (1993) calls
the productivist and distributivist versions of the modern
embodiments of the enterprise association, whose reliqious version
was epitomized by Calvinist Geneva, and in our own times is
provided by  Khomeni's Iran. Each of these collective forms
conjures up some notion of perfection, believed to be "the common
good" .I0
Combining these insights with those of the great
Swedish economic historian Eli Hecksher's Mercantilism, allows us
to provide a thumbnail sketch of the rise fall and rise of
economic liberalism during the last two hundred years.
The precursor of the 19th century LIE0 was the system of
mercantilism. It arose, as Hecksher has shown, from the desire of
the Renaissance princes of Europe to consolidate their power by
incorporating various feuding and seemingly disorderly groups
which constituted the relatively weak states they inherited from
the ruins of the Roman empire, into a "nation". This was a
"productivist" enterprise in Oakeshott's terms. The same
nationalist motive also underlay the very similar system of
mercantilist industrial and trade controls that were established
in much of the post war Third World.ll12
In the Third World, the jealousy, envy and resentment which
bred the European anti-individualist, was based not merely on the
dissolution of the previous communal ties that industrialization
and modern economic growth entail, but also because in these
post-colonial societies, such emotions were strengthened by a
feeling amongst the native elites, of a shared exclusion from
positions of power during the period of foreign domination. It is
not surprising therefore that the dominant ideology of the Third
World came to be a form of nationalism associated with some
combination of the productivist and distributivist versions of the
state viewed as an enterprise association. Historically, both
these secular collectivist  versions have led to dirigisme and the
suppression or control of the market.
In both cases of "nation-building" (in post Renaissance
Europe, and the modern Third and Second Worlds) the unintended
consequences of the similar system of mercantilist controls
instituted to establish ~~order~~ was to breed "disorder". As
economic controls became onerous, people attempted to escape them
through various forms of evasion and avoidance. As in 18th
century Europe, in the post war Third World, dirigisme bred
corruption, rent-seeking, tax evasion and illegal activities in
underground economies. The most serious consequence for the State
was an erosion of its fiscal base and the accompanying prospect of
the unMarxian withering away of the State. In both cases economic
liberalization was undertaken to restore the fiscal base, and
thence government control over what had become ungovernable
economies. In some cases the changeover could only occur through
revolution -- most notably in France.12
But the ensuing period of economic liberalism during the 19th
century's great Age of Reform, was short-lived in part due to the
rise of another substantive purpose that most European states came
to adopt -- the egalitarian ideal promulgated by the
Enlightenment. Governments in many developing countries also came
to espouse this ideal of socialism. The apotheosis of this13
version of the State viewed as an enterprise association were the
communist countries seeking to legislate the socialist ideal of
equalizing people. The collapse of their economies under similar
but even more severe strains than those that beset less
collectivist neo-mercantilist Third World economies is now
history, though I cannot help remarking on the irony that it took
two hundred years for 1989 to undo what 1789 had wrought!
III. WHEN?
If this account provides some reasons for the unravelling of
the 19th century  LIE0 , as well for its subsequent resurrection  -
gradually at first and more spectacularly in the last two decades-
the dating of this change is of some importance. The conference
organisers want us to indicate what event or date marks an
important turning point in this century. I would choose the OPEC
coup of 1973. For its major unintended consequence was to set in
motion various forces which undermined the intellectual consensus
underpinning the dirigisme of most economies in the first two
decades after the Second World War.
From the perspective of the Third World, the OPEC coup
represented the ultimate  politicisation of economic decisions in
the global economy. By forming commodity cartels it was hoped that
the resource rich countries of the developing world would hold the
rest of the world to ransom. Demands arose for a new international
economic order (NIEO) to replace the half baked  LIE0 which had
been established in the wake of the collapse of the international
system during the inter-war and 2nd world war period.
The partial restoration of the 19th century  LIE0 after
the second world war was based on 3 pillars created as the outcome
of the Bretton Woods conference: the IMF, World Bank and GATT.
They were institutionalized attempts to resurrect three of the
important elements of the 19th century LIE0 which had collapsed in
the early parts of this century: an international monetary system14
based on quasi-fixed exchange rates; flows of capital from
developed to developing countries; the freeing of trade and
payments regimes.
Of these the GATT was the most successful in resurrecting
another LIEO. Under its auspices trade was progressively
liberalized, which ushered in what has been termed the post war
"golden age". But even while world trade boomed, most developing
countries caught in the time warp of their import substitution
strategies, did not reap its full benefits, claiming and getting
their right to special privileges and exceptions in the emerging
global free trade regime. The NIEO was their final attempt to
replace this liberal trading order by one which was politically
managed.
But within a decade the wind had gone from their sails.
The supposed commodity power wielded by OPEC proved to be
illusory. As market oriented economists had predicted, any attempt
by a cartel to artificially raise the price of its product would
eventually come  unstuck.13 For such a price rise would first,
induce a search for substitutes which would reduce the demand for
the product, and second, lead to a search for alternative sources
of supply. Both occurred. Various members of the cartel also
succumbed to the temptation of increasing their share of the
rationed output at the expense of the other members. Within a
decade the oil price was no longer headline news. After the
failure of another brief attempt at rigging it in the late 197Os,
it has continued to decline in real terms ever  since.14 This
effectively killed the illiberal dream of the NIEO. GATT has now
successfully transformed itself into the WTO after its latest
Uruguay round, and developing countries are now its most loyal
supporters.
In the monetary sphere, the IMF was created to supervise
the new gold exchange rate system based on the adjustable peg. It
replaced the 19th century gold standard which, as the events of
the inter-war period had so painfully shown, could not be15
resurrected  : essentially because of the inflexibilities in the
workings of industrial labor markets, which did not permit the
flexibility of domestic money wages and prices on which
adjustments to economic shocks was predicated under the gold
standard. The socialist "enterprise" association viewpoint was
represented in the increasingly social democratic countries of the
West by Keyensian prescriptions of aggregate demand management to
maintain "full employment". Exchange rate changes were then deemed
to be necessary when a country could only cut its real wages to
achieve this target through a devaluation. The only country not
permitted this  'luxury' was the US- because it formed the base of
the gold exchange standard through its fixed parity with gold.
One consequence of the OPEC coup, which raised the costs
of an essential input in all non-oil producing countries, and its
partial monetary accommodation by most countries, was to raise
their general price levels. At a time when the US was already
suffering from the inflationary excesses associated with the
financing of the Vietnam war, this further push to the
inflationary process (and the stagnation in output that
accompanied it) made the US balance of payments unviable. A
devaluation was required to realign its domestic with the
international price level. This was achieved by President Nixon's
closing of the gold window, which in turn inflicted the coup de
grace to the gold exchange standard. The subsequent period has
seen the institution of a world wide free floating exchange rate
regime among the major economic powers, which has made it
unnecessary to use dirigiste means to manage the balance of
payments. This was the first benefit from the OPEC coup.
It also undermined the original mandate of the IMF, which
has since, like  Pirandello's I1 Six characters in search of an
author", been looking around for a play. It has skillfully found a
role in the ongoing adjustments from the plan to market underway
in both the Third and Second worlds. But this has a natural limit.
The IMF's future cannot be bright, particularly (as argued below)16
in light of its most recent actions in South East Asia.
The second benefit from the OPEC coup was that, the
ensuing stagflation exposed the fallacies of Keynesian
macroeconomics. Gradually all Western governments realized that
full employment could no longer be maintained by spending other
peoples money. The classical prescriptions of sound money and
deregulated labor markets (along with other supply side measures)
were the only way to deal with stagflation.
The third consequence, and the most momentous for the
Third World, arose from the disposition of their new found oil
wealth by the sparsely populated countries of the Middle East. The
inter-war collapse of world capital markets which involved many
defaults by third world borrowers led to their subsequent
exclusion from western capital markets: through exchange controls
which were ubiquitous in Europe -with the UK only abolishing them
in 1979- and legal restrictions eg. the 'blue sky' laws in the US.
The World Bank, or IBRD as its initial and still major component
is called, was set up as a financial intermediary to fill this
lacunae. Its intergovernmental ownership and guarantees allowed it
to borrow at preferential rates in developed country markets and
on-lend the money at near commercial interest rates to the Third
World. For those countries deemed too poor to borrow at these
rates a soft loan window -the IDA- was established with money
subscribed by Western governments. These governments had also
established their own bilateral foreign aid programs, mainly to
compete for political influence in the Third World during the Cold
War, than to serve their professed aim of alleviating world
poverty. As nearly all of these capital flows were mediated
through multilateral or bilateral governmental channels, the
access of developing countries to world capital markets was
necessarily politicized. This was in stark contrast to the 19th
century pattern when private capital flowed from Europe to the
rest of the world on market principles.
The OPEC coup set in train a chain of events which were17
to dramatically change this post war  politicisation of the
disposition of international capital. The OPEC countries could not
conceivably absorb the large surpluses derived from the oil price
rise domestically. They had to place them abroad. As Third World
capital markets were underdeveloped, this in effect meant the
West. But having obtained their new found wealth through a
political coup, the OPEC countries were fearful of placing it
within the reach of government's whose citizens they had robbed.
It could be confiscated: a not unreasonable fear as shown by the
subsequent sequestration of Iranian assets by President Carter. So
they placed their money in the off-shore branches of the money
center banks (the so called Eurocurrency market). These off-shore
banks had developed outside the jurisdiction and reach of their
parent monetary authorities and governments in the 1960s to allow
intermediation of capital flows to communist Europe  - which had
been equally wary of dealing directly with institutions which
would be subject to political pressure from its Cold war
adversaries.
The consequent explosion in the liquidity of these
Western off-shore branches led them to a frantic scramble to  on-
lend this money. This recycling of the OPEC surpluses, was also
pressed by their governments, who were concerned by the worldwide
deflationary consequences of an increase in the worldwide savings
propensity caused by the transfer of income from relatively low to
high savings propensity countries that the  Opec coup entailed.
There were many eager borrowers in the Third World, in particular
in the "inward looking" countries of Latin America. Thus the seeds
of the debt crisis were sown.
This bank lending to the Third World was based on
variable interest rates linked to LIBOR. When, in the late 1970's,
the US and subsequently much of Europe adopted sound money
policies to deal with the stagflation that had plagued them since
the OPEC coup, world interest rates and the cost of servicing debt
rose dramatically. As most of the Third World borrowers  - mainly18
in Latin America but not in East Asia- had borrowed to deal with
their longstanding fiscal deficits, they now found themselves
unable to service their debts. Starting with Mexico many in effect
defaulted on their obligations. They were forced to recognize- as
had the mercantilist states in the past- that the only way to
restore their diminished control over the economy was through
economic liberalization. Thus began the long drawn out process of
reform whereby dirigiste "inward looking" regimes are gradually
being replaced by more market friendly "outward looking" ones, all
over the globe.
Economic liberalization has also provided many
developing countries a new- found access to direct foreign and
portfolio investments. For them this is a more desirable form of
borrowing than bank borrowing at variable interest rates, because
the associated currency and income risks are shared with the
foreign investors. More sustainable forms of capital flows are
thus now available to developing countries willing to change
their nationalist attitudes to multinationals.15 These market
based capital flows now dwarf the politicized flows from bilateral
and multilateral agencies- whether they be IBRD loans or various
forms of foreign aid.(see Fig. 3) The future of this politicized
part of the world capital market is increasingly in jeopardy.16
Finally, the stagflation resulting from the OPEC coup also
led to the replacement of demand management by supply side
policies in most developed countries. Beginning with the
Thatcherite revolution in the UK, the worldwide movement towards
privatization, and deregulation  - in particular of labor markets-
is reversing nearly century old trends and the habits and
intellectual beliefs they had engendered. With the spectacular
collapse of the Communist economic  system,17 dirigisme for the
first time in a century is in worldwide retreat. It is a supreme
irony that the unintended consequences of the final push to set up
a politicized planned global economy initiated by the 1973 OPEC19
coup should have instead led to this new era of economic
liberalisation.
IV. WHAT NEXT?
What of the future? Is this new world wide "Age of
Reform" likely to be more permanent than its 19th century
predecessor ? There are auguries- both favorable and unfavorable.
(1) Fears: To take the latter first. The desire to view the
State as an enterprise association still lingers on, as part of
social democratic political agendas in many countries. It has
ancient roots and is unlikely to die. It has now adopted a
new voice, which Ken Minoguel* has labelled "constitutional
mania" .This emphasizes substantive social and economic rights
in addition to the well-known rights to liberty --freedom of
speech, contract, and association -emphasized by classical
liberals. It seeks to use the law to enforce these "rights"
based partly on "needs", and partly on the "equality of
respect" desired by a heterogeneity of self-selected
minorities differentiated by ethnicity, gender and/or sexual
orientation. But no less than in the collectivist societies
that have failed, this attempt to define and legislate a
newly discovered and dense structure of rights (including for
some activists those of non-human plants and animals)
requires a vast expansion of the government's power over
people's lives. Their implementation moreover requires -- at
the least -- some doctoring of the market mechanism. Then
there is the global environmental scare and the population
scare. Finally the UN has taken up the cause of the world's
poor and is seeking to establish a worldwide welfare state
through a UN economic security council. Classical liberals
can clearly not yet lay down their arms!
Equally worrying is the l'Delors" vision of Europe which
seems to be a form of mercantilist nation- building, in the manner